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which were designated BI-055. The lightweight RSRM's that were installed
j, 1'1 ~~i:).ch f.-3r:U3 hlen::~ dF,'S-, iqna tE'~c1 360LOi::?BP) 'fo)- th(:;~ 1 ~:~'ft ::3F~D, <'i.nc:! ::3bOU),~DB 1'0)- •
the right SRB. The primary objective of this flight was to successfully
deploy the Department of Defense 1 (DOD-I) payload. The secondary
objec:tivf::2S; e,f thi<::; 1"liqht klf.:.'rE~ to pf2r'fCtrm thf'2 Clr<f:!!I-;:,tic'rl~:> I-c:quirr~d b'y thf;;:'.
Glow Experiment/Cryogenic:: Heat Pipe Experiment PaylCtad (GCP); the
Halld-Held, Earth-Oriented, Real-Time, Cooperative, User-Friendly,
I (.. c· ..it-:'C.. ll .._ ..·I....'l·.. C'C·..··tJ·I..lr" "~I"'d E:'I"''':'I-('''I''I'''IC''l'''+'''] (';'''-.o.. ·\.. ,..·rl· ('t-lE':I':"C'\\ll:::'~)" '''\''1 f.' (';'[..\ ... , .. ,- "I")' <"""'1\'"
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Loss (GIL); the battletIeld Laser Acqulsltlon 8ensCtr lest (8LA~1 J; the,
Radiation Monitoring Equipment-III (RME-III); the Microcapsules in Space-l
(MIS-1); the Visual Function Tester-2 (VFT-2); the Cosmic Radi0tionF.ffect~".i and (.):ctivi'.d::ion l''ic:<nitor'' (Cr':;:EP,t···!); thE~ Cloud~'; Loqic t:c:, Uptirni::c~c~ u!?;!h •
o'f Defense Systems-1A (CLOUDS-1A); the Fluids Acquisition and Resupply
E;:pc'{"'imE>nt; (FPrF<E);: .'::Ina i;hf:2 DI'''biti-.'.<.l Df:':bl-i~; F:c'\c!c':<.l- Calibl-i-:!.'I:;ion 13phc:-l"·i::"!::; •
(ODERACS). In addition to presenting a summary of subsystem performance~
this report also discusses each Orbiter, ET, SGME, GRB, and RSRM in-flight
anomaly in the applicable section o·f the report. Listed in the discussi~n
c', 'j': (::" ," c"'I") "\ I" (", (1' 7< ] • I .j <::. t· t"l r:, ('" '1" '1" .j C J' :; '1 ] V 7:, <". "". :, 1"11'" 0;.:> (:I 'l: j'" ." '-I·;, ; "'1 C" )... , I -'I h (::, \.- .7,\ c=:. r- I \ t·, 1 :, <:::.J") -::. d" ,;)._ ......\ _ ... I.. 1t.:.. . > .. .... I_,. ... . .... ,t .. " I (;.~ ._..... J. ~:'. i 1_ • c.1...... 0'. I ..1 J,... h fJ.J .._ ~« ~ rJ - .J. J. _. t._ ,.. f
each Project Office in their respective Problem Tracking List. All times
given in this report are in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) as well as
mi :;:.,;:, D n f.:=:':1 E<P ·:::.E'[j '1'.: j. me.? (tilE r ) "
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INTRODUCTION
0 ---
The STS-53SpaceShuttleProgramMissionReportprovidesa summaryof the
: Orbiter,ExternalTank(ET),SolidRocketBooster/RedesignedSolidRocketMotor
(SRB/RSRM),andtheSpaceShuttlemainengine(SSME)subsystemsperformance
duringthefifty-secondflightof theSpaceShuttleProgram,andthefifteenth
flightof theOrbitervehicleDiscovery(OV-103).In additionto theOrbiter,
theflightvehicleconsistedof anET,whichwasdesignatedas ET-49/LWT-42;
threeSSME's,whichwereserialnumbers2024,2012,and2017inpositionsI,2,
and3, respectively;andtwoSRB's,whichweredesignatedBI-055.The
lightweightRSRM'sthatwereinstalledineachSRBweredesignated360L028Afor
theleftSRB,and360LO28BfortherightSRB.
TheSTS-53SpaceShuttleProgramMissionReportfulfillstheSpaceShuttle
Programrequirement,as documentedinNSTS07700,VolumeVIII,AppendixE, which
statesthateachmajororganizationelementsupportingtheprogramwillreport
theresultsof theirhardwarevaluationandmissionperformanceplusidentify
allrelatedin-flightanomalies.
Theprimaryobjectiveof thisflightwastosuccessfullydeploytheDepartment
of Defense1 (DOD-1)payload.Thesecondaryobjectivesof thisflightwereto
performtheoperationsrequiredby theGlowExperiment/CryogenlcHeatPipe
ExperimentPayload(GCP)_theHand-Held,Earth-Oriented,Real-time,Cooperative,
User-Friendly,Location-TargetingandEnvironmentalSystem(HERCULES);theSpace
TissueLoss(STL);theBattlefieldLaserAcquisitionSensorTest(BLAST)_the
O RadiationMonitoringEquipment-III(RME-III);theMicrocapsulesin Space-1(MIS-1)_theVisualFunctionTester-2(VFT-2)_theCosmicRadiationEffectsandActivationMonitor(CREAM)_theCloudsLogictoOptimizeUseof Defense
• Systems-lA(CLOUDS-1A);theFluidsAcquisitionandResupplyExperiment(FARE)_
andtheOrbitalDebrisRadarCalibrationSpheres(ODERACS).
-o
Thesequenceof eventsfortheSTS-53missionis showninTableI andthe
officialOrbiterandGFEProjectsProblemTrackingListisshowninTableII.
TheSTS-53missionwasoriginallyplannedas a six-daymission,butsubsequent
! missionplanningchangesledtoa seven-dayplannedmission.AppendixA lists
thesourcesof data,bothformalandinformal,thatwereusedin thepreparation
of thisdocument.AppendixB providesthedefinitionof acronymsand
abbreviationsu edin thisdocument.
i In additiontopresentinga summaryof subsystemperformance,thisreportalsodiscusseseachO biter,ET,SSME,SRB,andRSRMin-flight omalyin the
i applicablesectionof thereport.Listedin thediscussionof eachanomalyis
i theofficiallyassignedtrackingnumberas publishedby eachProjectOfficein|
theirrespectiveProblemTrackingList. Alltimesgivenin thisreportarein
Greenwichmeantime(G.m.t.)as wellas missionelapsedtime(MET)._ _\!'i
The crewforthisfifty-secondSpaceShuttlemissionwasDavidM. Walker,Capt.,
: USN,Commander;RobertP. Cabana,Col.,USMC,Pilot;GuionS.Bluford_Col.,
USAF,MissionSpecialistI_JamesS.Voss,Lt.Col.,USA,MissionSpecialist2_
andMichaelR. Clifford,Lt.Col.,USA,MissionSpecialist3. STS-53wasthe
fourthspaceflightforMissionSpecialistI; thethirdSpaceflightforthe
O Commander;thesecondspaceflightforthePilotandMissionSpecialist2; andthefirstspaceflightforMissionSpecial st3.
MISSIONSUMMARY @
The STS-53 vehicle was launchedon a 57-degreeinclinationfrom Kennedy Space
Center (KSC) launch complex 39A at 337:13:23:59.993G.m.t. (8:24 a.m.e.s.t, on
December 2, 1992), after a delay of I hour 25 minutes. The hold was required
for ice on the launch vehicle that subsequentlycleared, and for a wing load
indicatorAI6L predictedviolation. Analysis of the L-70 minute balloon data
produced a value of 103 percent for wing load indicatorA16L. The existing
structuralcertificationfor the wing has at least a 5-percentpositivemargin
to the load indicatorredline. In addition, the ongoingaerodynamic
verificationprogram, based on 0V-102 measured strain-gageresponses,shows the
aerodynamicbaseline data are conservative. As a result of the conservatismin
these areas, the 3-percentexcess load predictionwas determinedto be
acceptable,and the excess load conditionwas waived for_light.
Followinga three-minuteengine helium purge during the ExternalTank (ET)
loading sequence,the Space Shuttlemain engine (SSME) 3A 750-psihelium
regulatoroutlet pressurebegan togglingabove the 785-psiLaunch Commit
Criteria (LCC) upper limit. About 1 hour 20 minutes later, SSME 1B regulator
pressure also exceeded the LCC upper limit. An LCC waiver was approved for
these pressure excesses. Both pressures returned to within limfts when the
helium tanks were brought up to flight pressure (approximately 4400 psi) about 3
hours prior to launch. This behavior is a trait of the new -0006 regulators,
and the LCCand Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document (OMRSD)requirements will be reviewed in preparation for future
flights. @
This was the first flight of the OV-103(Discovery) vehicleafter major
modificationswere performedat KSC. The modificationsincludedthe
installationof a drag chute, as well as extensivemodificationsto the nose
wheel steering,landinggear, and hydraulics,as well as the addition of
redundantfuel-cellcutoff circuits. Data indicatenominalperformancefrom all
these areas of installationlmodification.
The direct ascent trajectorywas nominaland no orbitalmaneuveringsubsystem
(OMS) 1 maneuver was required. The OMS-2 maneuverwas performedat
337:14:00:53.8G.m.t., and was 204.0 seconds in duration. The aV was
337.9 ft/sec, and the resultantorbit was 200.6 by 200.6 nmi.
A quick-lookdeterminationof vehicleperformancewas made using vehicle
accelerationand preflightpropulsionpredictiondata. From these data, the
average flight-derlvedengine specific impulse (Isp) determinedfor the time
period between SRB separationand start of 3g throttlingwas 452.71 secondsas
compared to an averagemain propulsionsystem (MPS) tag value of 452.92 seconds.
At 337:19:38G.m.t. (00:06:14MET), the reaction controlsubsystem(RCS) was
used to perform a 19-secondseparationfiring in the +X direction.
During flight day 1 operations,the crew reporteda small amount of free water
during the humidity separatorwater check. Approximatelytwo hours later, the
second humidity separatorwater check was performed,and the crew again reported
a smallamountof freewater.Thewatercarry-overmayhavebeentheresultof
operating the cabin temperaturecontrollerin the automaticposition. The
2
carry-overwaswellwithinspecifications.Theamountofwaterdidnotrequire
O any mop-up operationsand the cabin humidityremainedat 25 Thepercent.
crew
switched to humidity separatorA as a precautionarymeasuredue to the upcoming
sleep period. An inspectionduring the post-sleepactivitiesrevealedthat the
: area aroundthehumidityseparatorwasdry. Thecrewswitchedbacktohumidity
separatorB.
A check of humidityseparatorB for water carry-overafter about six hours of
operationrevealedapproximatelyIcc of water attached to the wires near the
humidity separator. Due to the small amount of water, no mop-up of the water
was required. However, the crew was requestedto select humidityseparatorA
again, and subsequentoperationson humidity separatorA were satisfactory.
Engineeringanalysis indicatesthat humidity separatorB was operatingwithin
design requirementsand a small amount of carry-overmay be expectedwhen
operatingunder the conditionsdiscussedpreviously_....
•A decrease in the supply-waterdump-nozzletemperaturewas observedduring the
first supply water dump. The nozzle temperaturerecoveredand dumpingproceeded
nominally. The cause of the phenomenon.isunknown,but was most likely a
temporaryloss of power to the nozzle heatersas occurredon STS-39. Future
supply water dumps throughthe dump nozzle were performedas usual vlth no
recurrenceof the anomaly.
Evaluationof the data from the second throughseventhsupply water dumps
revealed that the dump valve had expelleda small amount of water after being
closed. This conditionis similar to that noted on STS-44 and STS-48. A
O similarphenomenonoccurredon all subsequentwater dumps. This conditiondidnot impact normal flight operations.
At 337:13:33G.m.t. (00:09:45MET), the speed brake flight controlsystem (FCS)
channel 3 position feedbackdata indicated45 degrees (0 volts) for
approximately48 minutes,and then returned to the normal level of -1.9 degrees.
The variabledownlist in the flight softwarewas reconfiguredand aerosurface
servo amplifier(ASA) 3 was poweredup so that the flight-crlticalmeasurement
could be monitoredshould the anomalyrecur. The originaloccurrencewas
indicatedonly on the operationalinstrumentation(OI)measurement.
Insufficientflight data were availableto determinewhether the anomalywas
associatedonly with instrumentationor whethera real channelfailureoccurred.
No recurrenceof this anomalywas observed for the remainderof the flight.
Postflighttroubleshootingat KSC identifieda faultywire crimp on a bulkhead
connectorwhich carries the positionfeedbacksignal to the aerosurfaceservo
amplifier.
The OMS 3 and OMS 4 single-enginemaneuverswere completedsatisfactorily. OMS
3 was performedwith the left engine,and OMS 4 was performedwith the right
engine. As a result of these two maneuvers,the Orbiterwas placed in a 177 by174 nml. orbit.
; Followingreconfigurationto the OMS/RCSinterconnectmode, the left RCS primary
oxidizer regulatoron leg A indicateda small leak in the primarystage. The
. regulatorpressure lockedup at the secondarystage value of 261.5 psia. The
system was switched to the B leg which operatedproperly.0
3
Thethirdon-orbitfuelcellpurgewasperformedat 342:01:24G.m.t.
(04:12:00MET)whichwasafter40 hoursinsteadof theplanned48 hoursbetween
purges.Theperformancedecaybetweenpurgeswasgreaterduringthismission
wlththe0.2V-decay-limit,as establishedby theflightrules,beingreached
after40 hours.Theprobablecauseisslightlymorethannormalcontaminantsin
thereactants(asindicatedby thesampleanalysis),andthisconditiondidnot
impactthemission.
TheFCScheckoutwasperformedusingAPU1 at 342:16:09:21G.m.t.
(05:02:52:09MET). APU1 wasoperatedfor8 minutes45 secondsand
approximately26 Ib of fuelwasconsumed.Allaspectsof theFCScheckoutwere
nominal.Also,allaspectsof theRCShot-firetestwhichfollowedwere
nominal.
FCS checkout data showed that 1 minute 44 secondsof lubricationoil spray
coolingoccurred on APU 1 due to the long durationof the APU run. As a result,
ice deposit on the water spray boiler (WSB) I vent nozzle was possible. Vent
heater 1B was activatedfor ice removalprior to preparationfor entry
operations.
A slngle-engine(right-hand)OMS-5 maneuverwas performedat
342:19:15:00.1G.m.t. (05:05:51:00MET). The firingdurationv_s 10.8 seconds
and the AV was 10.0 ftlsec.
An 8-secondRCSmaneuverwasperformedat 344:02:12G.m.t.(06:12:48MET)for
orbitaldebrisavoidance.The+X thrusters(L3AandR3A)wereusedforthis
2 ftlsecmaneuver.
Thepost-recoveryinspectionof therightSRBrevealeda 3-inchby ll8-inch
by 1/2-inchdeepgashin thecoverof theaftcenterboosterseparationmotor.
Analysisof foreignmaterialfoundembeddedin thecorkinsulationrevealedthat
thegashwasmostlikelytheresultof contactfroma pieceof Orbitertile
material.An analysisof thepotentialOrbitertilelossindicatedthatthe
impacton entryflightoperationswouldbe acceptable.Postflightvideodataof
theOrbiterlowersurfaceshowedno areasof significantdamage.Twotilesthat
hadbeenimpactedon theforwardright-handsideof theOrbiterwereidentified
as possiblesourcesof thedebristhatimpactedtheBSMcover.Thesetileswere
missingpartof theirtileidentificationmarkings.Samplesof bothtileswere
analyzed,andthesourceof thetileimpactscouldnotbe positivelydetermined
basedon thesamples.
Bothpayloadbaydoorswereclosednominallyby 344:15:39:27G.m.t.
(07:02:15:27MET). Weatherconditionsat theShuttleLandingFacility(SLF)
weredeterioratingandpredictedto be belowminimumrequirementsat landing.
As a result,theprimarylandingsitewaschangedtoEdwardsAirForceBase
(EAFB)on theorbitfollowingtheoriginallyplannedKSClanding.
Thedeorbitmaneuverwasperformedat 344:19:43:20.1G.m.t.(07:06:19:20.1MET).
Themaneuverwasapproximately150.6secondsin durationandtheAVwas
294.0ft/sec.Entryinterfaceoccurredat 344:20:12:12G.m.t.
(07:06:48:12MET).
o
4
The forwardRCS thrusterFIL began leakingoxidizerat 344:19:55G.m.t.
O 07:06:31MET) followingthe forwardRCS dump burn. Upon closureof themanifold isolationvalves (normalprocedurefollowingthe forwardRCS dump), the
manifold oxidizerpressurecontinuedto decay from 275 psia to about 56 psia,
: confirmingthe leak. Postlanding,the ground crew confirmeda 1 ppm to 2 ppm
concentrationin the area of the FIL thruster. After nearly 2 hours of
monitoringduring which the level remainedessentiallythe same, a fan was used
to clear the area of fumes so that the crew could exit the vehicle.
Main landinggear touchdownoccurredat EAFB, CA., on concreterunway 22 at
344:20:43:47G.m.t. (07:07:19:47MET) on December9, 1992. Nose landinggear
touchdownoccurred17 secondsafter main gear touchdownwith the Orbiterdrag
chute being deployedsatisfactorilyat 344:20:44:00.2G.m.t. The drag chute was
jettisonedat 344:20:44:24.9G.m.t.,with wheels stop occurringat
344:20:45:08G.m.t. Preliminaryindicationsare that the rolloutwas normal in
all respects. The flight durationwas 7 days 7 hours 19 minutes 47 seconds.
All three APU's were powereddown by 344:21:00:36.98G.m.t. The crew completed
the required postflightreconfigurationsand after about a 1 1/2 hour delay
because of the FIL thrusterleak, exited the Orbiterat 344:23:05G.m.t.
VEHICLEPERFORMANCE
SOLIDROCKETB00STERIREDESIGNEDSOLIDROCKETMOTORS
O ll SRB/RSRM systemsperformedas expectedwith no SRB-relatedin-flightanomaliesidentifiedon thisflight.No LCC or 0MRSD violationswerenoted.
The SRB prelaunchcountdownwasnormal.Power-upandoperationof all case,
igniter,and field joint heaterswas accomplishedroutinely. All RSRM
temperaturesweremaintainedwithinacceptablelimitsthroughoutthecountdown.
Forthisflight,theheatedgroundpurgein theSRBaftskirtwasusedto
maintain the caselnozzlejoint and flexiblebearing temperatureswithin the
requiredLCC ranges;the purge was used until T-15 minutes to inert the aft
skirt area of any accumulationof hydrazine.
Priorto SRB separation,a +8 percenturbinespeedspecificationlimit
violationoccurredon theleft-handthrustvectorcontrolrocksystemduringthe
nozzlenullsequence. The turbinespeedwent to 78,000rpm(77,760rpmis
specificationlimit).Thisexcessiveturbinespeedisattributedto a
combinationof actuatornull responsecharacteristicsand instrumentation
tolerance.Theexcessivespeedoccurredwhentheactuatoreachedthenull
positiontherebyrelievingtheloadon thesystem.Turbinespeedcontrolwas
maintained.A similarsituationoccurredon STS-41.Theeventisunderstood,
is within the experiencebase, and is not a concernfor future flights.
Hold-downpost (HDP) 1 experienceda stud hang-upwith associatedbroachingof
the HDP bore. This verified the resultsof the analysis of Orbiter
• accelerometerdata which indicatedthe probabilityof a stud hang-up. The
broachingwas within the experiencebase.
Three ordnancering pins and retainingclips were missing from the left-hand
O SRB. Severalclips in the area were bent out 90 degrees. Two clips were
5
displacedfrom the pin heads, but the pins were still in place. This occurred
during retrievalactivitieswhile untangling the left-hand1 main parachutefromthe SRB.
Dataindicatethattheflightperformanceof bothRSRM'swaswellwithinthe
allowableperformanceenvelopes,andwastypicalof theperformanceobservedon
previousflights.Therewereno RSRMLCCviolationsnorin-flightanomalies
identified.Themeanbulktemperaturewas68°Fat lift-off.Performancedata
are shown in the followingtable.
RSRM PROPULSIONPERFORMANCE
Parameter Left motor, 68°F RiGht motor, 680F
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
Impulsega_es
1-20, 10_ ibf-sec 65.13 64.67 65.29 64.53
1-60, 107 Ibf-sec 173.84 173.51 174.18 173.14
I-AT, 10b ibf-sec 296.83 296.79 296.71 296.33
Vacuum Isp, ibf-secllbm 268.5 268.5 268.5 268.2
Burn rate, inlsec @ 60°F 0.3674 0.3660 0.3681 0.3659
at 625 psia
Burn rate, inlsec @ 680F 0.3695 0.3680 0.3702 0.3678
at 625 psia
Event times, seconds
Ignition interval 0.232 NIA 0.232 NIA
Web timea 110.5 111.2 110.2 111.5
Separationcue, 50 psia 120.3 121.1 120.0 121.2
Action time 122.4 123.1 122.1 123.3
Separationcommand, sec 125.2 126.5 125.2 126.5
PMBT,OF 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0
Maximum ignition rise rate, 90.4 NIA 90.4 N/A
psia/10 ms
Decay time, seconds 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.6
(59.4psiato 85K)
Tailoff imbalance Predicted Actual.
Impulsedifferential, N/A 357.2_
klbf-sec
Notes:
a All times are referencedto ignitioncommand time exceptwhere noted by
the letter a. These items are referencedto lift-off time (Ignition
b interval).
Tailoff imbalanceis equal to left motor minus right motor, and was
calculatedby Marshall Space Flight Center.
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A 2.75-inchcut in the cork cover of the right-handSRB triplebooster
O separationmotors (BSM's)was found. This cut penetratedthe cork exposing theubstrate. Laboratoryanaly is showed that the v nt occurr dduring the ascent
phase. Residual material found in the cut matched samplesof Orbiter tile.
: Photographicanalysis of the launch films revealed five camera views that showed
"objects"of unknown origin passingnear (two views showing possiblestrikes)
the right-handaft BSM's.
The launch pad environmentfor the 10 hours prior to launch had a predominant
wind from the West at an averageof 6 knots and ambient temperaturesranging
from 46°F to 52°F. Temperaturesbelow 47°F and wind speeds below 5 knots were
experiencedat times prior to the openingof the launchwindow. With the
ambient temperatureand wind hoveringnear the lower LCC limit, the case
remainedwell above the lower LCC limit (34°F)with a minimum temperatureof
48°F.
Field joint heaters operatedfor 12 hours 43 minutes. Power was applied to the
heatingelement 47 percentof the time to maintain the field joints in their
normal operating temperaturerange. Igniterjoint heatersoperated for 19 hours
5 minuteswith power being appliedto the heatingelement83 percent (highest
percentageexperienced)of the time to maintainigniterjoints in their normal
operating temperaturerange.
The flexiblebearing temperatureswere maintainedabove 60°F by intermittent
activationof the aft skirt gaseousnitrogenpurge. The purge was operated
continuouslyduring the last 14 hours 3 minutesof the countdownto maintain the
O ozzle-to-casejoint above 75°F (minimumLCC temperature). To ensure that allhazardousgases were removedfrom the aft skirt compartment,the purge was
operated at high-flowrate from T-15 minutes to launch. As a result of the
purge operation,the flexiblebearingmean bulk temperaturewas 75°F.
Both SRB's were successfullyseparatedfrom the ET at lift-offplus
126.36 seconds, and reportsfrom the recoveryarea, based on visual sightings,
indicate that the decelerationsubsystemsperformedas designed. Both SRB's
were observedduring descent,and were retrievedas plannedand returned to KSC
for disassemblyand refurbishment.
EXTERNALTANK
Overall ET performancewas excellent. All objectivesand requirements
associatedwith ET propellantloadingand flight operationswere met. All ET
electricalequipmentand instrumentationoperatedsatisfactorily. ET purge and
heater operationswere monitoredand all performedproperly. No OMRSD
violationsor in-flightanomalieswere identified.
Typical icelfrostformationsfor the Decemberatmosphericenvironmentwere
observed on the ET during the countdown. Normal quantitiesof ice or frost were
presenton the liquid oxygen (LO_) and liquidhydrogen (LH2) feedlinesand the
: pressurizationline brackets,an_some frost and ice was presentalong the LH_
proturberanceair load (PAL) ramps. All of the observationswere acceptable_er
NSTS 08303.
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Ice/frostformationswerealsopresenton theacreageof theLO2 tanklower.
oglve and barrel and the LII2 tank barrel,mainly in the +Y, +Z quadrant. Thls
ice was judged by the Ice/FrostRed Team to exceed the 1/16-inchthicknessin IP'
the debris zone, which was an LCC violation. Launchwas delayed approximately
I hour 25 minutes until the Sun melted the ice; the Ice/Frost Red Team
reinspected the ET to verify that there were no longer any ET LCCviolations.
The ET pressurizationsystem functionedproperly throughoutengine start and
flight. The minimum LO2 ullage pressureexperiencedduring the period of ullage
pressure slump was 12.8 psid.
ET separationwas confirmed. Radar from Bermuda confirmedthat the ET did not
tumble. Main engine cutoff (NECO)occurredwithin the expected tolerances,and
ET entry and breakup occurredas predictedwith the impact point being
approximately17 miles uprange of the preflightprediction.
SPACE SHUTTLEMAIN ENGINE
All SSME parametersappeared to be normal throughoutthe prelaunchcountdown,
and were typicalof prelaunchparametersobservedon previous flights. Engine
ready was achieved at the proper time, all LCC were met, and engine start and
thrust buildupwas normal.
Flight data indicate that SSME performanceduring mainstage, throttling,
shutdown,and propellantdump operationswas normal. The high pressureoxidizer
turbopump(HPOTP)and high pressurefuel turbopump(BPFTP)temperaturesappeared
to be well within specificationthroughoutengine operation. There were two
in-flightanomaliesnoted. At 18.14 secondsafter lift-off,channelB of SSME 1
HPOTP secondaryseal cavity pressurewas disqualified(FlightProblem
STS-53-E-01). Spikingcontinueduntil 5 secondsafter engine shutdown. This
failure resulted in a loss of redline redundancyfor this parameter. Analysis
showed that the spikingwas caused by transientcontaminationfound in the
pressure transducer,and the sensor was replaced. The contaminationwas most
likely generatedwhen a connectorwas replacedduring the original fabrication.
A similar failurewas experiencedon STS-39 (FlightProblem STS-39-E-01).
The second anomalywas the failureof the low-pressurefuei turbopumpdischarge
temperaturesensor on SSME 1 (FlightProblemSTS-53-E-02). ChannelA exhibited
a single negative spike at 2.9 secondsafter engine start. The sensor was
replacedand failureanalysis is in progress.
Followinga three-minuteengine fuel system helium purge during the ET loading
sequence, the SSME 3A 750-psi helium regulatoroutlet pressure began toggling
from 784 to 788 psia, violating the 785-psiLCC upper limit (FlightProblem
STS-53-V-04). Nithln 30 minutes, the pressure rose one more bit-countto
792 psia. This was followed by a fuel system purge which dropped the outlet
pressure to 772 psla, nominal performanceduring a fuel system purge. After the
purge was concluded,the outlet pressureagain rose to 788-792psia and finally
stabilizedat 792 psia. One hour later, the fuel system purge was performed,
and a similar signaturewas noted. During this three-hourtime frame, the
SSME 1B regulatoroutlet pressureexhibitedsimilarpressures,startingat
780 psia and toggling twice to 788 psia. After MPS hellum bottle pressurization
occurred at Launch minus 3:20:00,all regulatorsshowed a decrease in outlet
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pressure. Five minutes after the bottles reached flight pressure, another fuel
O systempureewas performed.Steady-statepressurevaluesafterthe pureewerealllessthanor equalto 780 psia,and no moreviolationsof the785-psialimit
were notedduringthe countdown.An LCC waiverwas approvedfor thesepressure
: excesses.Thisbehavioris apparentlya traitof thenew -0006regulators,and
the LCC and 0MRSDrequirementsare beingre-evaluatedin preparationfor future
flights.
%
The OrbiterMADS recorderfailurepriorto launchresultedin thelossof SSME
vlbration/accelerometerdatadurinE ascent. The lossof thesedatawill impact
the SSMEhardwarereuseprogram(removaland retest/acceptanceof theHPOTP,and
specialinspectionsof the oxidizerpreburner(OPB)faceplateflatnesswillbe
required).
Reviewof enginestartfilmsrevealeda coldwall leakon SSME2. This typeof
phenomenonhas beenobservedon previousflightsof theSpaceShuttle.The
nozzlewillundergoleakisolationtestsand repairat KSC.
The oxidizerpreburneroxidizervalve(OPOV)skin temperaturesensor2 failedat
70 secondsafterenginestarton SSME3. Thismeasurementis usedonlydurinE
chillto detectliquidoxygenleakagedownstreamof theOP0Vballseal. The
sensorwas removedand replacedat KSC.
A spikein theHPFTPspeedwas observedat 1.6 secondsafterenginecutoffon
SSME3. Thismeasurementis usedonlyduringenginestartas an ignition
confirmindicator.This sensorwill be removedfor failureanalysisand
O replacedwitha spare.
SHUTTLERANGESAFETYSYSTEM
Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) closed-loop testin E was completed as
scheduled during the launch countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A) devices were
armed and system inhibits turned off at the appropriate times. All SRSS
measurements indicated that the system operated as expected throughout the
countdown and flight.
As planned, the SRB S&A devices were safed, and SRB system power was turned off
prior to SRB separation. The ET system remained active until ET separation from
the Orbiter.
ORBITERSUBSYSTEMPERFORMANCE
Main Propulsion System
The overall performance of the MPS was excellent. LO^ and LH2 loading was
performed as planned with no stop-flows or reverts. _here were no OMRSD
violations; however, both the SSME3A and SSME1B MPShelium regulator outlet
pressures violated the 785 psia maximumLCClimit, as discussed in the Space
• Shuttle Main Engine section of this report. Pneumatic regulator outlet
pressures were also high. After pressurization of the helium bottles, the
regulators performed well for the remainder of the countdown.
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Throughout the period of preflight operations, no significant hazardous gas
concentrations were detected. The maximumhydrogen concentration level in the
Orbiter aft compartment occurred shortly after the start of fast fill and was
approximately 170 ppm, which compares favorably with previous data for this
vehicle.
A comparisonof the calculatedpropellantloadsat theend of replenishversus
the inventoryloads,resultedin a loadingaccuracyof +0.04percentfor LH_,
whichis withinthe requiredloadingaccuracyof 0.57percent. The L02 loa_ing
accuracywas +0.I0percentfor theL02,whichis withintherequiredloading
accuracyfor L02 of _0.43percent.
The gaseousoxygenfixedorificepressurizationsystemperformedas predicted.
The gaseousheliumpressurizationsystemalsoperformednominally.Evaluation
of the flowcontrolvalvedata revealedno problems.
AscentMPS performanceappearedto be nominal. Data indicatethat theL02 and
LH9 pressurizationsystemsperformedas planned,and thatall net positive
suctionpressure(NPSP)requirementswere met throughouthe flight. The SSME 1
HPOTPsecondarysealcavitypressurechannelB failureis discussedin theSpace
ShuttleMainEngineSectionof thisreport.
All MPS systemsperformednominallyduringentryand landing. Helium
consumptionduringentrywas 59.1 ibm,whichwas withinthe flighthistoryof
0V-103.
Reaction Control Subsystem
The RCS supported and met all flight requirements, but two anomalies were noted
during the mission. Consumption of propellants was nominal for the mission with
5063.4 lbm used from the forward and aft RCS. In addition, the RCS was
interconnected to the OMSfor two periods during which 4.87 percent of OMS
propellantswas used.
When the leftRCS tankisolationvalveswere closedfollowingleft0MS
interconnect,theleftRCS oxidizerullageand tankpressuresincreasedabove
the primarystagelockuppressureof 255 psiato thesecondarylockuppressure
of 262 psiaduringthe 15-hourOMS interconnectperiod(FlightProblem
STS-53-V-06).The leakagewas calculatedto be 2500scchand theOMRSDlimitis
360 scch. A leakof approximately300 scchwas notedduringprelaunch
operations.The systemwas switchedto theB legwhichoperatedproperly.
The forwardRCS thrusterFIL beganleakingoxidizerat 344:19:55G.m.t.
(07:06:31MET) followingthecompletionof the forwardRCS dump burn (Flight
ProblemSTS-53-V-09).Upon closureof themanifoldisolationvalves(normal
procedurefollowingthe forwardRCS dump),themanifoldoxidizerpressure
continuedto decayfrom 275 psia to about56 psia,confirmingthe leak.
Postlanding,the groundcrewconfirmeda 1 ppm to 2 ppm concentrationin the
areaof theFIL thruster,and afternearly2 hoursof monitoringduringwhich
thelevelremainedessentiallythesame,a fanwas used to clearthe areaof
fumesso thatthe crew couldexit thevehicle.
o
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O OrbitalManeuveringSubsystem
The OMS performednominallythroughouthisflight. FlveOMS firingswere
completedas shownin thefollowingtable.
OMS Engine Time,G.m.t./MET Firing AV,
firing used duration, ft/sec
sec
2 Both 337:14:00:53.8 G.m.t. 204.0 337.9
00:36:53:8 MET
3 Left-hand 338:19:43:11.9 G.m.t. 49.5 45.9
01:06:19:11.9MET
4 Right-hand338:20:26:03.0G.m.t. 51.4 49.0
01:07:02:03.0MET
5 Right-hand342:19:15:00.1G.m.t. 10.8 10.0
05:05:51:00.1MET
DOB Both 344:19:43:20.1G.m.t. 150.1 294.1
07:06:19:20.1MET
O The totalburn timeon the leftOMSwas 403.6secondsand the rightOMS was416.3seconds. Gagingsystemperformancewas nomi alwith threeof thefour
systemsoperatingproperly.The left-handfuelgagewas biasedhigh.
Propellantconsumptionby theOMS was 16,455ib includingthatusedby theRCS
duringinterconnectoperations.DuringleftOHS interconnectoperations,
3.27percentof theleft0MS propellantswere usedby theRCS and duringright
OHS interconnectoperations,1.60percentof the right0MS propellantswereused.
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
The power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem performed nominally
throughout the mission. The vehicle was flown in the four-tank-set
configuration. The PRSD subsystem supplied 1640.4 lb of oxygen and 206.6 lb of
hydrogen to the fuel cells for the production of 2382.9 kwh of electrical
energy. Based on lift-off and landing quantities, approximately 41.9 lb of
oxygen was supplied to the environmental control system for crew breathing. An
83.1-hour mission extension at the average power level was possible with the
reactants remaining in the PRSDsubsystem at touchdown.
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem
: The fuelcellpowerplantsubsystemperformednominallythroughoutthemission.
Duringthe175.3-hourmission,thefuelcellsproduced2382.9kwhof electrical
energyand1847ib of potablewaterfrom1640.4Ibof oxygen and206.6lb of
" hydrogen.TheaveragetotalOrbiterelectricalpower/loadwas13.6 kW/444.2amperes.
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Fuelcells2 and3 werebustiedfor1 hourandi0minutesto supporthe
deploymentof theDOD-1payloadon flightdayI. Theactualfuelcellvoltages
at theendof themissionwere0.1-voltabovethepredictedforfuelcellI and
0.2-voltabovethepredictedforfuelcells2 and3.
Sixpurgeswereperformedat approximately20,68,I08,127,141,and166hours
MET. Theflightruleforfuelcellpurgingwas topurgeevery48 hoursor if a
0.2-voltdegradationwasreachedsincethepreviouspurgebyanyfuelcell.
Voltagedecayof 0.2voltwasobservedon allthreefuelcellspriorto the
planned48-hourpurgeintervalas comparedto a 0.1-voltdecayover48 hours
observedon previousmissions.Thefuelcellswerethereforepurgedbasedon
thedegradationlimitof 0.2voltforthelastthreepurges.Theincreased
decaywas theresultof theoxygen,althoughwithinspecification,havinga
higherinertcontenthannormallyobservedon previousmissions.
Thethermalperformanceof thefuelcellwaterrelief,waterline,andreactant
purgesystemswasnominal.Allheatersoperatedwithintheirnormalranges
exceptthefuelcell1 waterreliefvalveA heaterthathadveryshortheater
cycles indicating a dithering thermostat that closed at the appropriate
temperature,but opened too soon.
AuxiliaryPower Unit Subsystem
The improved auxiliarypower unit (IAPU) subsystemoperatednominallythroughout
the mission. Fuel consumptionand IAPU run times are shown in the following
table.
IAPU1 (SIN405) IAPU2 (SIN406) IAPU3 (SIN404) Q
FlightPhase Time, Fuel Time, Fuel Time, Fuel
min:secconsumptlon,min:sec consumption,!min:seconsumption,
ib Ib Ib
Ascent 20:09 54 20:08 56 20:10 58
FCScheckout 8:45 26
Entrya 61:09 130 82:14 176 61:10 146
Totala 90:03 210 102:22 232 81:20 204
Notes:
a TheIAPU'sranfor16minutes50 secondsafterlanding.
TheAPU 1, 2, and3 fuelservicelinetemperaturescycledhigherthanexpected
requlrinE theupperFDAlimitforthesemeasurementsobe changedby table
maintenanceblockupdate(TMBU)to 140°F,1400F,and1300F,respectively.These
temperaturesensorshadbeenrelocatedfromthetestlineto theserviceline
priorto themission[duringOrbitermaintenancedownperiod(OMDP)]as a part
of the APU smart-short heater modification. Since the service line has
different thermalcharacteristicsthan the test line, the old FDA limit of 1100F
should have been adjusted accordingly. This will be done before the next flight
of this vehicle.
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About 15 minutesafter APU shutdown followingascent,the APU 1 test line
O emperature1 (V46T0183A)reached49°F, just above the 48@F FDA limit. Thisrequired the crew to activate the fuelllinelwatersystemA heater system earlier
than planned. Upon activationof the heater system, the temperaturesreturned
: to the normal heatingrange.
On the third day of the mission, the APU 3 drain line temperature1 (V46TO386A)
was changed by TMBU from 48°F to 45°F to preventnuisancealarms. The drain
line temperaturehad reacheda minimumof 48°F at the heater Cycle low point due
to a vehicle attitudechange.
The APU 1 fuel pump inlet pressuremeasurement(V46P0110A)failedoff-scalehigh
upon activationof the fuel isolationvalves just prior to the preflight
confidencerun. APU 1 was approved to fly the missionwithout this
instrumentation,and the transducerwill be removedand replacedduring
postflight turnaroundactivities.
When the lubricationoil heaterswere switchedfrom the A to the B system
followingthe FCS checkoutper normal operations,the APU 1 lubricationoil B
system heater did not cycle until the lubricationoll temperature(V46TO154A)
reached 46°F approachingthe lower FDA limit of 40°F. The thermostatset point
was 51.90F. The thermostatwas relocatedduring OMDP to gain better access.
The temperatureat which the thermostatcycled is well within the toleranceof
the instrumentationand locationof the sensorwith respect to the thermostat.
There was no abnormaloperationof the heater system.
O Hydraulics/WaterSpray Boiler Subsystem
The hydraulics/WSBsubsystemperformednominallythroughoutall phases of the
mission. The FCS checkout (performedusing APU 1) was nominalwith spray
coolingbeginningabout 1 112 minutesprior to IAPU deactivation.
During prelaunchoperations,the system 2 bootstrapaccumulatorexperienceda
rapid pressuredecay (approximately250 psilhr). Pressuredecay rates greater
than 32 psilhr are usually indicativeof contaminationin the unloadervalve.
Subsequentsystem 2 accumulatorrechargesindicatednominalperformanceduring
the prelaunchand on-orbitphases of the flight,and no action will be taken
with the accumulator.
The WSB regulatorpressuredecayedfrom 29.1 psi to 23.7 psi throughoutthe
on-orbit period. The decay rate was approximately0.85 psi/daywhich is within
specification(i.e.,above the allowableexponentialdecay). The -1 valves
assembly has a historyof seals taking a set and leaking.
Because of the change in landingsites and the wave-off,longer-than-normalWSB
operationsfor entry were required. During this period,WSB 1 steam vent B
heatersdisplayederratic performance. About 3 1/2 hours after WSB 1 heater
activationfor entry, the WSB 1B steam vent temperaturefell below the 130°F
: "WSB Ready"temperature.The WSB was switchedfrom the B to the A controller
and the heater operationrecovered. Originally,data suggestedthat ice removal
mightbe affectingtheheaterinitialperformance,andthattheheatermay not
be failed. As a result,the WSB was switchedback to B controllerfollowingthe
O deorbit burn. Although subsequentoperationwas erratic, the B WSB
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controllerlheatersoperated and WSB 1 vent heating during entry was performedas
scheduledon B controller. This occurrencewas determinedto be anomalous
(FlightProblem STS-53-V-II)becauseof normal operationson the A controller.
Also, the WSB's are not certifiedfor entry with failed-offheaters.
ElectricalPower Distributionand Control Subsystem
The electricalpower distributionand control (EPDC)subsystemperformancewas
nominalwith no problems identified. All data analyzedshowed nominal voltage
and current signatures,and no specifiedlimitswere violated. STS-53 was the
first flight of 0V-103 after major modificationswere performedon the vehicle.
The major modificationsincluded the installationof a drag chute, improvednose
wheel steering,landinggear changes,hydraulicschangesand fuel cell redundant
shutoffcircuits. All electricalhardware related to these
modlficationslimprovementsperformednominally.
PyrotechnicsSubsystem
The pyrotechnicssubsystemoperated properlywith all functionsbeing performed
as planned.
The postflightinspectionrevealed that all three ETlOrblterseparationdevices
(EO-1, -2, and -3) operated satisfactorily. All ET/Orbiterumbilicalseparation
ordnance retentionshutterswere closed properly. No flighthardwarewas found
on the runway below the umbillcalswhen the ETlOrbiterdoors were opened.
Aft FuselageGas SamplinG System
The data obtained during ascent by the Orbiteraft fuselagegas samplingsystem
(AFGSS)were nominal for STS-53. The hydrogenconcentrationand oxygen
concentrationwere well within the data base for all Shuttlevehicles. All six
bottlescontainedexcellentsampleswith less than 15-percentair in the sample.
These six bottles were vacuum processedat a temperatureof 275°F.
EnvironmentalControland Life SupportSubsystem
The active thermal controlsystem (ATCS) performancewas nominal. The flash
evaporator system (FES) was deactivatedfor severalperiodsduring the flight to
support payload operations. The FES was used to performseveral supply water
dumps and performednominally.
A temperaturesensor on FES feedlineA exceededits FDA upper limit of 140°F at
340:10:10G.m.t. (02:20:46MET). The feedlinehad been stagnant for a long
period of time and local hot spots were created. Nhen the FES was pulsed
momentarily,it caused a hot slug of water to traveldown the feedlineand that
slug coincidedwith a peak in the heater duty cycle, and these conditions
resulted in the sudden rise in temperature. No action was necessaryas the
heater cycled normally and the temperaturesremainedwithin their expected
ranges.
The radiator coldsoak provided coolingduring entry through touchdownplus
19 minutes, after which the ammoniasystem B was activated. After 44 minutes, .. _
system B was depleted and system A was activated. However,before systemA was gturned on, Freon cooling loop 2 was switched to bypass flow which had the effect
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of increasing the FES flowrate and temperature. This activity was performed to
prevent ammonia system A from operating at less than the minimum controltemperature of 32OF. The procedure accomplished its purpose and system A
controlled to 36°F. System A was deactivated after 10 minutes of operation when
: ground coolingwas connected.
The atmosphericrevitalizationsystem performancewas normal throughoutthe
mission. Humidity separatorB had a few drops of water at its air outlet after
being "slugged"with condensatewater from the cabin hear exchanger. Separator
A was used after flightday 2. Ground tests will determineif separatorB
requiresreplacement.
The supply water and waste managementsystem performedadequatelythroughoutthe
mission. Supply water was managed throughthe use of the overboarddump system
and the FES. Seven supply water dumps were performedat an averagedump rate of
1.42 percent/minute(2.35 ib/minute). The supply water dump line temperature
was maintainedbetween62°F and 98°F throughoutthe missionwith the operation
of the line heater.
During flight day 1 operations,the crew reporteda small amount of free water
during the humidityseparatorwater check. Approximatelytwo hours later, the
second humidity separatorwater check was performed,and the crew again reported
a small amount of free water. The _ater carry-overmay have been the resultof
operatingthe cabin temperaturecontrollerin the automaticposition. The
carry-overwas well within specifications. The amount of water did not require
any mop-up operationsand the cabin humidity remainedat 25 percent. The crew
switched to humidity separatorA as a precautionarymeasuredue to the upcomingleep peri d. An insp ctionduring the post-sleepactivitiesrevealedthat the
area around the humidityseparatorwas dry. The crew switchedback to humidity
separatorB.
A check of humidityseparatorB for water carry-overafter about six hours of
operationrevealedapproximatelyIcc of water attached to the wires near the
humidityseparator. Due to the small amount of water, no mop-up of the water
was required. However, the crew was requestedto select humidityseparatorA
again, and subsequentoperationson humidityseparatorA were satisfactory.
Engineeringanalysls indicatesthat humidityseparatorB was operatingwithin
design requirementsand a slight amount of carry-overmay be expectedwhen
operatingunder the conditionsdiscussedpreviously.
A decrease in the supplywater dump nozzle temperaturewas observedduring the
first supply water dump (FlightProblemSTS-53-V-03). The nozzle temperature
recoveredand dumping proceedednominally. The cause of the phenomenonis
unknown, but was most likelya temporaryloss of power to the nozzle heatersas
occurred on STS-39. Future supplywater dumps throughthe dump nozzle were
performedas usual with no recurrenceo£ the anomaly.
Waste water was gatheredat approximatelythe predictedrate. Two waste water
: dumps were performedat a rate of 1.9 percentlminute(3.14 Ib/minute). The
waste water dump line temperaturewas maintainedbetween55°F and 98°F
throughoutthe mission, while the vacuum vent line temperaturewas between59°F
and 83°F.
@
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Flight data indicate internal leakagethrough the supply water dump valve after
dumps 2 through7 (FlightProblem STS-53-V-05). This expulsion (burping) dmt
phenomenonhas been confirmedto have occurredon STS-48 and STS-44,and is
suspected to have occurredon previous flightsof 0V-103 and 0V-104. The valve
was replacedafter STS-48;however, testingon that valve has not repeated the
phenomenon.
The waste collectionsystem performednormally throughoutthe mission.
The pressure controlsystem performancewas satisfactorywith the exceptionof
partial pressure oxygen (PP09)sensor C which exhibitedan erratic outputduring
the entry phase of the missi6n (FlightProblemSTS-53-V-10). No crew action was
necessary for this failure,as this sensorwas a monitor-onlysensor and was not
required for PPO2 control.
Smoke Detectionand Fire SuppressionSubsystem
The smoke.detectionsubsystemperformednormally throughoutthe flight,and use
of the fire suppressionsubsystemwas not required.
Airlock SupportSubsystem
All airlock supportsubsystemparametersremainedwithin expectedranges
throughoutthe flight. Use of the airlock extravehicularactivity (EVA)
facilitieswas not required.
Avionicsand SoftwareSubsystem d_&
The performanceof the avionicsand softwaresubsystemwas satisfactory
throughoutthe mission.
The integratedguidance,navigationand controlsystem performedsatisfactorily.
The FCS performancewas satisfactoryfor launch,FCS checkout,and entry,
although one anomalywas noted and is discussedin the followingparagraph.
The speedbrakechannel 3 position feedbackoperationalinstrumentation(OI)
measurement (V57H0252A)changed from the zero degree indicationto 450 (0 volt
position)during ascent and remained at that indicationfor approximately
48 minutes (FlightProblemSTS-53-V-02). Prior to the transitionto the
on-orbit configuration,insufficientflight data were availableto determine
whether this was an 0I measurementproblemor a flight criticalhardware
problem. This anomaly did not recur during the remainderof the flight. Speed
brake channel 3 performednominallyduring FCS checkoutand entry. Postflight
troubleshootingat KSC identifieda faulty wire crimp on a bulkheadconnector
which carries the position feedbacktransducersignal to the aerosurfaceservo
amplifier. Had this intermittentconditionoccurredduring a time when the
flight control system was active, a failureof the flight controlchannelwould
have been annunciated. Mission rules invoke a minimumduration flight for a
confirmedfailure of this type.
0
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The inertialmeasurementunit (IMU)and star trackerperformancewas nominal
O throughout the mission with no problemsidentified.Likewise,the performanceof the dataproce singsystemha dwarean flightsoftwarewas nominalwithno
anomaliesidentified.
: The displaysand control(D&C)subsystemperformedsatisfactorily;however,
duringthe FCS checkout,it was notedthattherewas a slightdelayof the
B pole on thepanel12 entrymodeselectswitchto make contact.This is a
' four-pole,lever-lockedswitch.Switchesof thistypehave beenknownto exhibit
"switchteasing"characteristics.This occurrencewas not considereda failure
of the switchand didnot impact the mission.
The operationalinstrumentationsubsystemperformedsatisfactorily;however,the
modularauxiliarydata system(MADS)providedno usabledata becauseit
apparentlyfaileddue to an incorrectuplinkcommandsequencepriorto launch.
The ?[ADSrecorderwas commandedon per thenormaluplinkprocedurespriorto
launch. This commandwas to be followedby a calibrationcommand;however,a
commandto stop therecorderwas inadvertentlysentwhiletherecorderwas
operatingat 15 inches/second.Thissequencecan resultin tapebreakagein the
l-g verticalrecorderposition.Attemptsto restartthe recorderwere
unsuccessful,and no MADSdatawere recordedduringthemission(FlightProblem
STS-53-V-01).
Communicationsand TrackinG Subsystems
Performanceof the S-band,Ku-band,UHF,and FM communicationsequipmentwas
satisfactory.Data evaluationis progressingin an effortto determinethe
O air-to-ground1 about2 hoursbeforelandingwhen the crewcauseof thenoise
on
used thehand-heldmicrophone(FlightProblemSTS-53-V-12).
CCTV cameraC was poweredup in preparationfor theODERACSexperiment
deployment;however,the cameraproducedonlycoloredhorizontal inesand no
discerniblepicture(FlightProblemSTS-53-V-07).CameraB was substitutedfor
cameraC for the deployment.The deploymentof the0DERACSexperiment,however,
was not successful.
At 341:09:24G.m.t.(03:21:00MET),the firstpageof the textand graphics
system(TAGS)morningmailwas sentand a jam occurred(FlightProblem
STS-53-V-08).A pageadvancewas sent,but thejam remained. Shortlyafterthe
crewawakened,one of thecrewopenedthe frontcoverof theTAGSand notedthat
theboosterroller,whichshouldroll continuously,had stopped.The crew
cycledthe powerto theTAGS,butwas unsuccessfulin regainingTAGS operation.
As a result,the teleprinterwas used for uplinkingthemorningmail. After
furtherevaluation,the decisionwas made to leavetheTAGS in the powered-down
configurationbecauseof therollermotormalfunction,and use the teleprinter
and PADM for uplinkingthemail for the remainderof the mission.
Structuresand MechanicalSubsTstems
All structuresandmechanicalsubsystemsequipmentoperatednominallythroughout
themission. This includedtheventdoors,ET/Orbiterumbilicaldoors,payload
o
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bay doors, star tracker doors, Ku-band antenna deployment actuator, and air data
probe system. Landingand brakingdata are containedin the followingtable. O
LANDINGANDBRAKINGPARAMETERS
From
Parameter threshold, Speed, Sinkrate,ft/sec Pitchrate,
ft keas de_/sec ,
Maingeartouchdown 1268 212.4 "3.0 n/a
Nosegeartouchdown 6345 144.9 n/a 1.9
Braking initiationspeed 109.9 knots (keas)
Brake-on time 48.2 seconds (not sustained)
Rollout distance 10,696 feet
Rollout time 72.8 seconds
Runway 22 (concrete)at EAFB
Orbiterweight at landing 193,987 Ib
Peak
Brake sensor location pressure, Brake assembly " Energy,
psia million ft-lb
Left-handinboard 1 515 Left-handoutboard 6.20
Left-handinboard 3 489 Left-handinboard 9.98
Left-handoutboard 2 502 Right-hand inboard 11.31 dmt
Left-handoutboard4 489 Right-handoutboard 6.00
Right-hand inboard 1 621
Right-hand inboard3 793
Right-handoutboard 2 555
Right-handoutboard 4 621
Tire location Pressure, Tire temperature,°F Temperaturedecal,
psia OF
Left-handoutboard 340.6 17.9
Left-hand inboard 338.4 17.9
Right-hand inboard 338.4 17.9
Right-handoutboard 336.2 17.9
Left-handnose gear 347.3 52.7
Right-handnose gear 358.8 52.7
Although the in-flightcheckout requirementfor dual motor drive-timeof
63 seconds for the payloadbay doors was exceededby 2 seconds (actualdrive
time = 65 seconds), this longer drive-timewas anticipatedbecause the bending
effects temperature(BET) was greater than 100°F by 5°F. Past flight data has
shown that longer door-drive times can be expected for BET's that are greater
thanIO0°F. O
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This flight marked the fifth use of the drag chute. The drag chute functioned
satisfactorilyand providedthe desiredslowingof the vehicle. Duringdeployment,the drag chut rod to th left of the centerlinein both the reefed
and disreefedcondition. All drag chute hardwarewas recoveredand showed no
: signs of abnormaloperation. Actual chute angle and headingangle determination
is being completedusing the photographicdata.
, Aerodynamics_Heating,and ThermalInterfaces
The ascent and entry aerodynamicswere nominal;however,ascent was completed
with a waiver of a potentialviolationof load indicatorAI6L. The predicted
violationof wing load indicatorAI6L caused a hold in the countdown. Analysis
of the L-70-minuteballoondata produceda value of 103 percentfor wing load
indicatorAI6L. The existingstructuralcertificationfor the wing has at least
a 5-percentpositivemargin to the load indicatorredline. In addition,the
on-going aerodynamicverificationprogram,based on 0V-102measured strain-gage
responses,shows the aerodynamicbaselinedata are conservative. As a resultof
the conservatismin these areas, the 3-percentexcess load predictionwas
determinedto be acceptableand the potentialexcess load was waived for flight.
The aerodynamicand plume heatingduring ascent was nominal. Entry aerodynamic
heatingwas within the thermalprotectionsubsystem(TPS) limits;however,an
unusualsideslipof 1 to 2 degreeswas noted betweenentry velocitiesof
15,000 and 7,000 ftlsec. Analysisof this conditioncontinues.
The thermal interfacetemperaturesprior to launch were within interfacecontrol
document (ICD) limits during all missionphases. Two concernswere expressedbyevaluationpersonnelin that the adequacyof the LH2 ET/Orbiterumbilicalcavity
purge cannot be determinedbecauseno direct measurementof this conditionis
available. Also, accurate temperaturelvindspeed data are difficultto obtain
because of the lack of knowledgeof which Orbiterinstrumentationmeasurements
to use for temperatureand wind-speedindications. Additionally,no criteria
exist to allow recoveryafter an LCC is violated.
Thermal ControlSubsystem
The performanceof the Orbiter thermalcontrolsubsystem(TCS)was nominal
during all phases of the mission, and all subsystemtemperatureswere maintained
within acceptablelimits.
All three APU service line temperature2 values cycledhigh and beyond the
nominal on-orbithigh value observedon previousmissions of thisvehicle. The
upper FDA limit was raised from I10°F to 140°F to preventalarms during the
sleep periods. The temperaturecyclingtime was about one hour and the peak
values were near 130"F. These temperaturesensorshave been moved since the
last flight of this vehicle. Subsequentanalysis indicatesthese temperatures
to be normal for the present configuration.
: Aerothermodynamics
Acreage heatingwas nominalwith all structuraltemperaturesand structural
temperaturerise rates within limitsand the experiencebase. Local acreage@
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heating was normal and the postflight thermal protection subsystem (TPS) damage
inspection results were within the experience base. The lack of MADSdata viii
hamper some of the calculations normally performed in this area of concern.
Thermal Protection Subsystem
The Orbiter TPS performed nominally, providing the required protection of the
Orbiter vehicle. Information to determine the time of boundary layer transition
fromlaminarflowto turbulentflowwasnotavailablebecauseof thefailureof
theMADSrecorder.
The TPS sustained a total of 240 hits, of which 23 had a major dimension of one
inch or greater. This total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat
shield that are attributed to SSMEvibration/acoustics and exhaust plume
recirculation. A comparison of these statistics with those from 36 previous
missions indicate that the overall number of hits was greater than average, and
the number of hits one inch or larger was average.
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 145 hits, of which 11 had a major
dimension of one inch or greater and that number is less than average. The
majority of this damage occurred on the right side of the vehicle and is
primarily attributed to ice from the LO_ feedline. A cluster of 56 hits, with
two greater than one inch, was observed-forward and outboard of the ET/Orbiter
_ mbilical opening. Similar clusters have been observed on previous flightsare attributed to ice/debris impacts at ET separation.
The post-recovery inspection of the right SRB revealed a 3-inch by 1/8-inch by
1/2-inch deep gash in the cover of the aft center booster separation motor
(BSM). Analysis of foreign material found embedded in the cork insulation at
the gash was identified as Orbiter tile material, and was of no concern for
entry. During the postflight evaluation, two impacted tiles on the forward
right-hand side of the vehicle were identified as possible sources of the debris
which impacted the BSM cover. These tiles were missing part of their tile
identification markings. Samples were taken from these impacted tiles and
analyzed, and the source of the tile impacts could not be determined based on
the analyzed samples. However, the amount of material missing from the tiles
could not have caused the observed SRB damage.
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, tires, or brakes. The
main landing gear tires were considered to be in excellent condition for a
landing on a concrete runway.
The left-hand reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) panel 9 exhibited a 4-inch by
2.5-inch area of coating that was bubbling and spalling. Left-hand RCC panel 6,
right-hand RCC panel 13, and left-hand RCC T-seals 8, 14, and 16 all exhibited
smaller areas of coating bubbling and spalling.
Tile damage on the base heat shield was typical. Four dome-mounted heat shield
(DMHS)closeoutblanketsacrificialpanelswerenearlydetachedfromthe1:30to
4:30 o'clock position on SSME 2, exposing the inner blanketlayer. This layer
was eroded/missingin a number of places revealingthe underlyingbatting
material.Theouterlayerof theDMHSspliceat the6 o'clockpositionon SSME
1 exhibitedminorfraying.Allof theremainingDMHSblanketswereinexcellent
condition. v
i
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The were no obvious indicationsof the SSME 2 nozzle cold wail fire that was
O observed during the postlaunch film review. Tiles on the trailing edge of thebody flap immediately underneath SSME 2 were discolored (milky white). This
discoloration may have resulted from the nozzle fire.
The tiles on the left-hand 0MS pod leading edge suffered more damage than usual.
Access to this area was not possible at the Dryden Flight Research Facility
, (DFRF);consequently,thenumberof impactsitesanddimensionsareapproximate.
Orbiterwindows3 and4 exhibitedtypicalhazingandstreaking.Onlya very
lighthazewaspresenton theotherforward-facingwindows(I,2, 5, and6).
Surfacewipesweretakenfromwindows1 through6 forlaboratoryanalysis.A
totalof 33 hitswithonegreaterthanoneinchwerenotedon theperimeter
tilesaroundwindows1 through6. Mostallof thesehitsweresmallandshallow
indepthandmayhavebeencausedby roomtemperaturevulcanizing(RTV)usedto
bondpapercoversto theforwardRCSenginenozzles, exhaustproductsfromthe
SRBboosterseparationmotors,ice/TPSdebrisfromtheET LO2 tank,or anycombinationof thesethree.
A Cyclops infrared spot radiometer was used to measure the surface temperatures
on several areas of the Orbiter in accordance with 0MRSDrequirements.
Two hours and twenty-seven minutes after landing, the nosecap Orbiter RCCwas
I05°F. The rlght-handwing leadingedgeRCC panel9 was measuredimmediately
followingthenosecapmeasurementand the temperaturewas 73"F,and the
temperatureof panel17 was 72°F. Thesetemperatureswere takenmuchlaterthan
usualaftertouchdownbecauseof theoxidizerleak.
O GOVERNMENTFURNISHEDEOUIPMENT/FLIGHTCREWEQUIPMENT
Thecrewwasunableto findtheCommander'seatingutensils.Theactualstowage
locationwasdeterminedandreportedto thecrewtheeveningof flightdayI.
Thecrewreporteduringthetechnicaldebriefing%hattheCommander'sutensils
werefoundthemorningof theflightday2 in thestowagelocationthatwas
giventhemthepreviousday.
Thecrewnotedthatthebatteryadapterwasmissingfromthe16-mmArrlflex
camerathefirsttimethecamerawasunstowed.Theadapterisheldinplaceby
a thumbscrew.Thecamerashouldhavebeenstowedwiththeadapterattached.
An in-flightmaintenance(IFM)procedurewasapprovedtopowerup thecamera
usingtheIFMbreakoutbox.
CARGOINTEGRATION
Cargo integration hardware and systems operated nominally throughout the
mission. No new mission-unique hardware was provided for this mission. The
: majoreffortduringthemissionwasin supportof theODERACSexperimentwhich
was inoperativeb causeof a dead batteryas discussedin thefollowingsection
of thereport.fQ
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PAYLOADS
0
DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE-i
TheDOD-1 payloadwasdeployedon thefirstflightdayat 337:19:18G.m.t.
(00:05:54MET).
ORBITALDEBRISRADARCALIBRATIONSPHERES
The six ODERACSspheres were planned for deployment on orbit 31 to calibrate
ground radars and optical telescopes. However, a dead gas control decoder (GCD)
battery prevented the get away special (GAS) canister door from opening. No
method was available to recharge the battery from the crew compartment. Time
did not permit the development of an engineering solution to perform an
EVA to recharge the battery. As a result, the spheres were not deployed, but
the experiment has been manifested for STS-56.
GLOWEXPERIMENT/CRYOGENICHEATPIPEEXPERIMENT
Overall,theGlowExperiment(GLO)/CryogenicHeatPipeExperiment(CRYOHP)
payload(GCP)wasa non-standardhitchhikerpayloadmountedon thestarboard
sidewallof thepayloadbay. Theexperimentwasusedto observeOrbiterandair
glow,RCSmaneuvers,waterdumps,andFESoperations.TheGCPwasvery
successful,eventhoughtheorbitaldarknessrequiredforGLOdidnotoccur
untilflightday6. A totalof 20 of 23 plannedpremissionrequirementsforthe
GLOweremet. A totalof eightcyclesfortheCRYOHPweresuccessfully
completed,withonlyfiveplannedpremission.
CLOUDLOGICTO OPTIMIZETHEUSEOF DEFENSESYSTEMS
The objective of the cloud logic to optimize the use of defense systems (CLOUDS)
military man in space experiment was to quantify the variation in apparent cloud
cover as a function of the angle at which clouds are viewed from orbit. Data
from CLOUDSwill be stored in a high resolution data base for use by the
meteorologicalcommunityandvariousdefensemeteorologicalsatelliteprogram
initiatives.Althoughthebatteriestowedin theCLOUDSdatapackweredead,
theflightcrewwasabletochangethebatteries,initializethedatapack,and
successfullycompletetheCLOUDSdatagatheringobjectivesforthismission.
Fourteentargetswereuplinkedto thecrewduringthemission.
FLUIDACQUISITIONA DRESUPPLYEXPERIMENT
Thefluidacquisitionandresupplyexperiment(FARE)investigatedthedynamics
of fluidtransferin microgravity.Theorientationof liquidsinweightlessness
ishighlyunpredictableb causetheliquidmaylocateinanyareawithinthe
containerandmayencapsulatelargegasbubbles.
TheFAREalsoexperienceda batteryfailurebeforeoperationsbegan.The
cassettedatataperecorder(CDTR)internalclockispoweredby an Everready
357BPwatchbattery.Thefailureof thebatterywasnotmissioncriticalsince %
an alternativemethodexisted.However,theflightcrewfounda replacement
batteryandwasableto completealleightof theFAREtestsplanned.
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MICROCAPSULESIN SPACE
O The Microcapsulesin Space(MIS)was recentlydevelopedand theobjectiveof MIS
was to increasetheknowledgeof microencapsulateddrug technology.Crew
t membersperformedtwoexperimentsto producetime-releasedantibiotic
microcapsules.The antibioticampicillinwas microencapsulatedwith a
biodegradablepolymer. Scientistshavereasonto believethatmicrocapsules
, made in weightlessnesshavepropertiesvastlysuperiorto microcapsulesmadeon
Earth.
The MIS was activatedfor 4.5 hours and deactivatedas planned. During the
mission, the crew reportedMIS temperaturesdaily with the range being 74°F to
78°F which is nominal.
RADIATIONMONITORINGEOUIPMENT-III
The RadiationMonitoringEquipment-III(RME-III)measuredtheexposureof the
Orbiterto ionizingradiation.The doserateand totalaccumulatedradiation
dose of the crewmemberwas measuredsimultaneously.TheRME-IIIoperated
nominallyduringthemission.The crewalsoperformedmemorymodulechangesas
planned.
SPACETISSUELOSS
The SpaceTissueLoss (STL)hardwareoperatedwithoutany anomaliesduringthe
STS-53mission. The WalterReedArmy Instituteof Researchwas the development
O organizationfor the experimenthardwareand the evaluationof the results.
VISUALFUNCTIONTESTER
The modelII VisualFunctionTester(VFT-2)was used to performa seriesof
visionperformancexperimentson the crewmembersaboardthe Orbiterto assess
theeffectof microgravityon visualfunction.All VFT testswere performedas
planned.
BATTLEFIELDLASERACQUISITIONSENSORTEST
The BattlefieldLaserAcquisitionSensorTest (BLAST)demonstratedthe
technologyassociatedwithusinga space-bornelaserreceiverto detectlaser
energyfromground-basedtestlocations.A totalof 20 targetsof opportunity
wereavailableforuse of theBLASThardware,and of the20 targets,onlytwo
weresuccessfullycompleted,and thesewere overMalabarand over theAMOS site.
A totalof 18 couldnot be completed.Nine couldnot be completedbecauseof
inclementweather;fourcouldnot be completedbecauseof groundsitehardware
problems;one couldnot be completedbecauseof an unidentifiedaircraftin the
air space;and fourcouldnot be completedforunknownreasons.
. HAND-HELD,EARTH-ORIENTED,REAL-TIME,COOPERATIVE,USER-FRIENDLY,LOCATION-
TARGETINGAND ENVIRONMENTALSYSTEM
The Hand-Held,EarthOriented,Real-Time,Cooperative,User-Friendly,#
Location-targetingand EnvironmentalSystem(HERCULES)was developedwas
O developedby scientiststo enablethe Shuttlecrewmemberto pointa cameraatan interestingfeatureon theEarth,recordthe image,and determinethe
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latitude and longitude of the feature within two nautical miles. Approximately
78 pictures were reported to have been taken by the flight crew. Premission
planning included 48 sites of which 25 were required (15 acquired) to meet
lO0-percent of the experiment objectives. The remaining exposures were of
alternate targets of opportunity.
COSMICRADIATION_EFFECTSANDACTIVATIONMONITOR
The Cosmic Radiation Effects and Activation Monitor (CREAM)collected data on
the cosmic ray energy loss spectra, neutron fluxes and induced radioactivity.
The data were collected by both active and passive monitors placed at specific
locations in the crew compartment. CREAMdata were collected from the same
locations as the RME-III so that a correlation between these data could be
attempted.
DEVELOPMENTTEST OBJECTIVES/DETAILEDSUPPLEMENTARYOBJECTIVES
A total of 11 development test objectives (DTO's) and 12 detailed supplementary
objectives (DSO'S) were assigned to the STS-53 mission. Five of the 11DTO's
were completed. The remaining six were not completed because these were
data-only DTO's which required data from the MADSrecorder for successful
completion. The MADSrecorder was lost before lift-off because of a ground
controller error.
All 12 of the planned DSO°s were completed.
DEVELOPMENTTESTOBJECTIVES g
DTO 301D - Ascent StructuralCapabilityEvaluation- This was a data-onlyDTO
andlossof theMADSrecorderesultedin thisDTO not beingcompleted.
DTO 305D - Ascent CompartmentVenting Evaluation- This was a data-onlyDTO and
loss of the MADS recorder resultedin this DTO not being completed.
DTO 306D - Descent CompartmentVenting Evaluation- This was a data-onlyDTO and
lossof theMADSrecorderesultedin thisDTOnotbeingcompleted.
DTO307D- EntryStructuralCapability- Thiswasa data-onlyDTOandlossof
theMADSrecorderesultedin thisDTOnotbeingcompleted.
DTO308D- VibrationandAcousticsEvaluation- Thiswasa data-onlyDT0and
lossof theMADSrecorderesultedin thisDTOnotbeingcompleted.
DTO 319D - Shuttle/PayloadLow FrequencyEnvironment- This was a data-onlyDTO
and loss of the MADS recorderresulted in this DTO not being completed.
DTO312- ET TPS Performance-Method3 - ThisDT0 was completedas plannedwith
both magazinesof film exposed (72 photographs)taken using a Nikon F4 camera
bodywitha 300mm lensanda 2X converter. The ET aftertheseparationfrom
the Orbiter appeared to be in good condition. The normal ET TPS charringand
SRBseparationburnscarswereobserved. _._g
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The preliminary analysis of the 72 photographs from magazine 19 and 27 are given
O in the following paragraphs.
The magazine 19 film consisted of 36 good quality frames (views) of the ET. The
: firstpicturewas acquiredapproximately5 minutes36 secondsafterET
separation,and the lastframewas acquiredapproximately8 minutes34 seconds
afterET separation.Itemsof interestnotedwere threedivotsin theET aft
, dome. Two of the divotswere on the -Z sideand one was on the+Z sideof the
ET. Possibleventingwas alsonotedcomingfrom theET liquidhydrogen
umbilical.In addition,two probabledivotswere observedon theliquid
hydrogentank/intertankinterfaceon the ET +Y axis,and two possibledivots
wereseen belowthe ET groundumbilicalcarrierplate(GUCP)in theliquid
hydrogentank/intertankinterfaceTPS on the -Y axis.
Magazine27 contained36 excellentqualityphotographsusingtheNikonhand-held
camerawith a 300-mmlensand 2X extender.A focusingproblemwas evidentat
the beginningand end of the film. The firstframeof thismagazinewas taken
approximatelyI0 minutesand 39 secondsafterET separation,and the lastframe
was takenapproximately12 minutesafterET separation.The onlyitemof
interestwas a possibledivoton theET liquidhydrogentank/intertankinterface
belowtheantennato the leftof the forwardbipod.
DTO 521 - Evaluationof DragChuteSystem- The Orbiterdrag chutewas deployed
at the initiationof derotationas planned,and thedrag chuteoperated
nominally.
Q DTO 653 - Evaluationof MKI RowingMachine- The evaluationof thisrowingmachinewas completedas planned.
DTO 656 - PGSCSingleEventUpsetMonitoring- Monitoringwas completedin
conformancewith the requirementsestablisheduringpremissionbriefings.
DTO 663 - AcousticalNoiseEvaluation- Thisevaluationwas performedby the
crewand the dataare beinganalyzedby thesponsor. A separatereportwillbe
publishedby theDTO sponsor.
DTO 805 - CrosswindLandingPerformance- The crosswindswerenot strongenough
to meet the requirementsof thisDTO.
DETAILEDSECONDARYOBJECTIVES
DSO 469 - RadiationDoseDistribution- Data for thisDS0 were collectedand are
beingevaluatedby thesponsor.
DSO 472 - IntraocularPressure- Measurementsweremadeas plannedof the
intraocularportionof theeye.
DSO 474 - RetinalPhotography- All requirementsof thisDSO weremet and the
: data are beingevaluatedby thesponsor.
DSO 479 - HypersomaticFluidCountermeasure- The requirementsof thisDSOwere
' completed,and the dataand resultsare beingevaluatedby thesponsor.
e
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DSO 603B - OrthostaticFunctionDuring Entry, Landing, and Egress - All
requirementsof this DSO were completedand the data are being evaluatedby the
sponsor.
DSO 604 - Visual VestibularIntegrationas a Function of Adaption - The
in-fllghtrequirementsof this DSO were met and the data are being evaluatedby
the sponsor.
#
DSO 605 - PostureEquilibriumControlDuring Landing and Egress- Measurements
for this DSO were made and are being evaluatedby the sponsor.
DSO 608 - Effects of Space Flight on Aerobicand AnaerobicMetabolismDuring
Exercise - The requirementsof this DSO were met and are being evaluatedby the
sponsor.
DSO 901 - DocumentaryTelevision= The requirementsof this DSO were met and the
data are being evaluatedby the sponsor.
DSO 902 - DocumentaryMotion PicturePhotography- The requirementsof this DSO
were met and the photographyis being evaluatedby the sponsor.
DSO 903 - DocumentaryStill Photography- The requirementsof this DSO were met
and the photographyare being evaluatedby the sponsor.
PHOTOGRAPHICAND TELEVISIONANALYSES
LAUNCHDATA ANALYSIS O
The STS-53 launch videos (24) were reviewed and no anomalous conditions were
noted. Also, launch films (54 of 55) were reviewed, and two possible anomalous
conditions were observed in footage from launch pad camera E-9. The conditions
noted were a bolt hangup at hold down post M-1 at llft-off and orange vapor at
hatband 9 on SSME 2. Both conditions were later verified to be no problem.
ON-ORBIT DATA ANALYSIS
Late in the mission during the post-recoveryinspectionof the right SRB, a
3-inch by ll8-inch by 1/2-1nchdeep gash was found in the cover of the aft
center booster separationmotor. Analysis of foreignmaterial found embeddedin
the cork insulationrevealed that the gash was most likely the result of contact
from a piece of Orbiter tile material. As a result, the launch films of the
right SRB aft skirt were rescreenedfor indicationof debris that may have been
related to thls finding. No evidence of any problemcould be found in the
films. An analysis of the potentialOrbiter tile loss indicatedthat the impact
on entry flight operationswould be acceptable. Postflightvideo data of the
Orbiter lower surface showed no areas of significantdamage.
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LANDINGDATAANALYSIS
Six landingvideos includingthe NASA Selectwere receivedand reviewed
approximatelyfour hours after landing. No anomalousconditionswere noted in
the landingvideos.
Video coverageof the drag chute deploymentand jettisonwas also reviewed. The
• deploymentof the drag chute appearedas expected. The drag chute appeared to
drift to the left of the Orbiter centerline(longitudinalaxis) as the vehicle
slowed down prior to drag chute release.
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TABLEI.- STS-53SEQUENCEOF EVENTS O
Event Description Actualtime,
G.m.t.
APU activation APU-IGG chamberpressure 337:13:19:10.38
APU-2GG chamberpressure 337:13:19:11.33 #
APU-3GG chamberpressure 337:13:19:12.40
SRB HPU activation LH HPU systemA startcommand 337:13:23:32.36
LH HPU systemB startcommand
RH HPU systemA startcommand 337:13:23:32.36
RH HPU systemB startcommand
Main propulsion Engine3 startcommandaccepted 337:13:23:53.44
Systemstart Engine2 startcommandaccepted 337:13:23:53.56
Engine1 startcommandaccepted 337:13:23:53.66
SRB ignitioncommand SRB ignitioncommandto SRB 337:13:23:59.993
(lift-off)
Throttleup to Engine1 commandaccepted 337:13:24:04.06
100 percentthrust Engine3 commandaccepted 337:13:24:04.08
Engine 2 command accepted 337:13:24:04.08
Throttle down to Engine 1 commandaccepted 337:13:24:28.06
73 percent thrust Engine 3 commandaccepted 337:13:24:28.08
Engine 2 commandaccepted 337:13:24:28.08
IMaximum dynamic Derived ascent dynamic 337:13:24:53
pressure(q) pressure
Thr°ttlle04percenUtPt°thrust Enginee Eenginei commanC°dmmanc°dmmandaccepteadc eptead cepted 333733737!131:31:3:225255:01:.01:'01"220108O
Both SRM'schamber RH SRM chamberpressure 337:13:26:01.07
pressureat 50 psi mid-rangeselect
LH SRM chamberpressure 337:13:26:01.19
mid-rangeselect
End SRM action RH SRM chamberpressure 337:13:26:03.32
mid-rangeselect
LH SRM chamberpressure 337:13:26:03.60
mid-rangeselect
SRB separationcommand SRB separationcommandflag 337:13:26:06
SRB physical LH rateAPU A turbinespeedLOS 337:13:26:06.35
separation RH rateAPU A turbinespeedLOS 337:13:26:06.35
Throttledown for Engine1 commandaccepted 337:13:31:29.19
3g acceleration Engine2 commandaccepted 337:13:31:29.21
Engine3 commandaccepted 337:13:31:29.21
3g acceleration Totalload factor 337:13:31:29.11
Throttledown to Engine1 commandaccepted 337:13:32:27.11
67 percentthrust Engine2 commandaccepted 337:13:32:27.13
Engine3 commandaccepted 337:13:32:27.13
EngineShutdown Engine1 commandaccept 337:13:32:33.31
Engine 2 commandaccept 337:13:32:33.33 :
Engine 3 command accept 337:13:32:33.33
MECO Commandflag 337:13:32:34
Confirmflag 337:13:32:35 "
e
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O TABLEI.- STS-53SEQUENCEOF EVENTS(Continued)
.. Event Description Actualtime,
G.m.t.
ET separation ET separationcommandflag 337:13:32:52
, OMS-Iignition Leftenginebi-propvalve Not performed-
position directinsertion
Rightenginebi-propvalve trajectoryflown
position
OMS-I cutoff Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Rightenginehi-propvalve
position
APU deactivation APU-IGG chamberpressure 337:13:39:18.79
APU-2GG chamberpressure 337:13:39:20.72
APU-3GG chamberpressure 337:13:39:22.48
OMS-2ignition Rightenginehi-propvalve 337:14:00:53.8
position
Leftenginebi-propvalve 337:14:00:53.8
position
OMS-2cutoff Rightenginebirprop valve 337:14:04:17.8
position
Leftenginebi-propvalve 337:14:04:18.0
position
O Payload bay door open PLBD right open 1 337:15:05:23PLBD left open 1 337:15:06:41DOD-1 Deploy Voice call 337:19:18
OMS-3ignition Rightenginebi-propvalve Not applicable
position
Leftenginebi-propvalve 338:19:43:11.9
position
OMS-3cutoff Rightenginebi-propvalve Not applicable
position
Leftenginebi-propvalve 338:19:44:01.9
position
OHS-4ignition Rightenginebi-propvalve 338:20:26:03.0
position
Leftenginebi-propvalve Not applicable
position
OMS-4cutoff Rightenginebi-propvalve 338:20:26:54.6
position
Leftenginebi-propvalve Not applicable
position
Flight control
system checkout
APU start APU-1GG chamberpressure 342:16:16:09.21
; APUstop APU-IGG chamberpressure 342:16:24:54.14
OMS-5ignition Rightenginebi-propvalve 342:19:15:00.1
position
' Left engine bi-prop valve Not applicable
O position
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TABLEI.- STS-53SEQUENCEOF EVENTS(Concluded) O
Event Description Actualtime,
G.m.t.
0MS-5cutoff Rightenginebi-propvalve 342:19:15:11.3
position
Left enginebi-propvalve Not applicable
position
Payloadbay door PLBD leftclose1 344:15:37:32
close PLBDrightclose1 344:15:39:27
APU activation APU-IGG chamberpressure 344:19:59:25.67
forentry APU-2GG chamberpressure 344:19:38:21.53
APU-3GG chamberpressure 344:19:59:26.92
Deorbitmaneuver Leftenginebi-propvalve 344:19:43:20.1
ignition position
Rightenginebi-propvalve 344:19:43:20.2
position
Deorbitmaneuver Leftenginebi_propvalve 344:19:45:50.7
cutoff position
Rightenginebi-propvalve 34&:19:45:50.8
position
Entryinterface Currentorbitalaltitude 344:20:12:12
(400K) abovereference llipsoid
Blackoutends Datalockedat high sample No blackout
rate
Terminalarea Majormodechange(305) 344:20:37:35
energymanagement
Main landinggear LH MLG tirepressure 344:20:43:47
contact RH MLG tirepressure 344:20:43:47
Main landinggear LH MLG weighton wheels 344:20:43:47
weighton wheels RH MLG weighton wheels 344:20:43:47
Drag chutedeploy Dragchutedeploy1CP Volts 344:20:44:00.2
Nose landinggear NLG tirepressure 344:20:44:04
contact
Nose landinggear NLG WT on Wheels-1 344:20:44:04
weighton wheels
Drag chutejettison Dragchutejettison1 CP Volts 344:20:44:24.9
Wheelsstop Velocitywith respectto 344:20:45:08
runway
APU deactivation APU-IGG chamberpressure 344:21:00:34.77
APU-2GG chamberpressure 344:21:00:35.65
APU-3GG chamberpressure 344:21:00:36.98
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TABLE II.- STS-53 PROBLEM_I_ LIST
Number Title Reference Comments
STS-53-V-01 MADS Recorder Did Not 337:13:08 G.m.t. The initial on command was satisfactory. However, the second command
Start When Commanded (Prelaunch) inadvertently coulnanded the recorder to Standby/Off 11 seconds later.
IN 53RF01 _ecorder would not restart. Suspect broken tape due to abnormal
INS-3-16-0622 co"uand sequence in one g.
KSC: Remove and replace MADS recorder. No ferry impact.
STS-53-V-02 Speedbrake FCS Channel 3 337:13:34 G.m.t. The OI position feedback measurement (V57H0252A) indlcated 45 degrees
Position Feedback Anomaly IPR 56V-0002 (0 volt position) for approximately 48 minutes, then returned to
notlnal. No visibility of flight critical _easurement (V57H0203C).
Variable downllst established to monitor FCS measurement for possible
recurrence. Anomaly did not recur during FCS checkout or entry.
Insufficient flight data available to isolate anomaly to
instrumentation only.
KSC: Postflight troubleshooting plan developed.
STS-53-V-03SupplyWater Nozzle 337:23:16 G.m.t. The supplywaterdmepnozzle temperature dropped approximately 50°F in
Temperature Drop IPR 56V-0012 one minute during dump and subsequently recovered. Suspect
intermittent heater power loss. Recurrence of previous OV-103 anomaly
(STS-39 HA). Line, valve, and nozzle removed and replaced after STS-48
due to valve leakage. No ferry impact.
PR I)DC-2-14-0055 KSC: Postflight troubleshooting required. Continuity checks and
wiggle tests of suspected areas.
STS-53-V-04 MPS Helium Regulators 3A Prelaunch Prior to bringing MPS helium tanks to flight pressure, both regulators
and 1B Exceeded LCC IPR 53V-0184 exceeded the 785-psia LCC upper limit. Attributed to known
bo Limits IN 53RF05 characteristic of new -0006 regulator design. LCC and OMRSD to be
reviewed. L_N 378 under review. No ferry impact.
I_SC: No action required.
STS-53-V-05 Supply Water Dump Valve 339:10:14 G.m.t. Valve expelled (burped) some water following the second supply water
Leakage. IPR 56V-0014 dump. Changed procedure to bake out nozzle to 250oF following dumps,
but anomaly recurred on all subsequent dumps. This phenomena has
occurred previously on OV-103 (STS-48) and OV-104 [STS-44). Suspect
ice formation in valve. No ferry impact.
KSC: Inspect heater installation around dump valve. Possible
drawing change required.
STS-53-V-06 Left RCS oxidizer A Leg 339:01:00 O.m.t. When RCS tank isolation valves were closed after left ONS interconnect,
Regulator Leaked through IM53RF02 the left RCS oxidizer ullage and tank pressures increased past the
Primery Stage CPR 56V-0003 primary stage lookup pressures to the secondary lockup pressure of
1261.5 psia. Leakage calculated to be 2500 scch (OMRSlimit = 360).hpproximetely 300 scch was noted during prelaunch activities. Suspect
particulate contamination in poppet area.
KSC: Normal OMRSDturnaround activities. No ferry impact.
STS-53-V-07 Camera C Failed. 339:10:47 G.m.t. Crew reported that CCTV camera C video consisted of only bright-colored
lines when powered up.
KSC: Remove camera and ship to JSC.
STS-53-V-08 TAGS Jam (GFE) 341:09:24 O.m.t. TAGS _anm_d on first page of transmission. Crew reported booster
tOM 3-16-0209 roller was stopped.
KSC: Removed TAGS at Dryden and shipped to JSC.
TABLE II.- STS-53PROBLEMTRACKINGLIST
Number Ti tl • Refe renca Comments
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STS-53-V-09 RCS Thruster FIL Oxidizer 344:19:55 G.m.t. RCS thruster FIL began leaking oxidizer following the forward RCS dump
LeakDuringEntry I/453RF03 burn.Ferryflightimpact.Drainmanifoldandapply20pslgnitrogen
IPR 56V-0005 pad pressure. Manifold ISO VLV I (OX and FUEL) were the only ones
closed.
KSC:
STS-53-V-10 PPO2 Sensor C Erratic 344:20:12 G.m.t. PPO2 sensor C experienced erratic output. Shifts noted of up to
IM 53RF04 1.2 psi. New style sensor. Postlanding inspection showed sensor to b_
IPR 56V-0013 loose in amplifier.
KSC: Sensor removed at Dryden for shipment to vendor. KSC trouble-
shooting also required.
STS-53-V-11 WSB 1B Steam Vent 344:18:47 G.m.t. About 2 1/2 hours after WSB 1 heater activation for entry, the WSB 1B
Temperature Erratic steam vent temperature became erratic and fell below the 130op WS8
Ready temperature about 1 hour later. Switched to A controller and
heaterrecovered.Followingdeorbltnaneuver,switchedbackto
B controller and heaters worked, although still erratically. Trouble-
shooting should include 4 hours on B controller with high data rate,
and 4 hours of A controller with high data rate.
STS-53-V-12PoorQualityAudioonA/G 344:17:10G.m.t. Duringdeorbltpreparation,thecrewmanusingtheMS ATU andhand-held
microphone was low In volume wlth a buzzing noise. Postfllght
troubleshooting in progress.
t_
•., • •
DOCUMENTSOURCES
In an attemptto definetheofficialas wellas theunofficialsourcesof data
for thisSTS-53MissionReport,the followinglistis provided.
|
I. FlightRequirementsDocument
2. PublicAffairsPressKit
3. CustomerSupportRoomDailyReports
4. MER DailyReports
5. MER MissionSummaryReport
6. MER QuickLookReport
7. MER ProblemTrackingList
8. MER EventTimes
9. SubsystemManagerReports/Inputs
i0. MOD SystemsAnomalyList
II. MSFCFlashReport
12. MSFCEventTimes
13. MSFCInterimReport
14. CrewDebriefinE comments
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O ACRONYMSAND ABBREVIATIONS
€
The followingis a listof theacronymsand abbreviationsand theirdefinitions
as theseitemsare used in thisdocument.
AFGSS Aft FuselageGas SamplingSystem
APU auxiliarypowerunit
ASA aerosurfaceactuator
ATCS Activethermalcontrolsystem
BET bendingeffectstemperature
BLAST BattlefieldLaserAcquisitionSensorTest
BSM boosterseparationmotor
CCTV closedcircuittelevision
CDTR cassettedatataperecorder
CLOUDS CloudsLogicto OptimizeUse of DefenseSystems-iA
CREAM CosmicRadiationEffectsandActivationMonitor
CRYOHP CryogenicHeatPipeExperiment
D & C Displaysand Controls
DFRF DrydenFlightResearchFacility
DMHS dome-mountedheatshield
DOD-I Departmentof Defensepayload
DSO DetailedSupplementaryObjective
DTO DevelopmentTestObjective
O AV differentialvelocityEAFB EdwardsAir ForceBaseEO ET/Orbiter
EPDC electricalpowerdistributionand controlsubsystem
ET ExternalTank
EVA extravehicularactivity
FARE FluidsAcquisitionand ResupplyExperiment
FCS flightcontrolsystem
FDA faultdetectionand annunciationsubsystem
FES flashevaporatorsystem
FM frequencymodulation
GCD gas controldecoder
GCP GlowExperiment/CryogenicHeatPipeExperimentPayload
GFE Governmentfurnishedequipment
GLO GlowExperiment
G.m.t. Greenwichmean time
GUCP groundumbilicalcarrierplate
HDP hold downpost
HERCULES Hand-Held,Earth-Oriented,Real-Time,Cooperative,User-Friendly,
Location-Targetingand EnvironmentalSystem
HPFTP high pressurefuelturbopump
HPOTP high pressureoxidizerturbopump
IAPU improvedauxiliarypowerunit
ICD interfacecontroldocument
IFM in-flightmaintenance
IMU inertialmeasurementunit
O Isp specificimpulse
B-I
KSC Kennedy Space Center
LCC Launch Commit Criteria Ira,
LESC Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company
i_ liquid hydrogen
liquid oxygen
lightweight
MADS modular auxiliary data system
MECO main engine cutoff
MET missionelapsedtime
MIS Microcapsulesin Space
MPS main propulsionsystem
NPSP net positivesuctionpressure
OAFGSS OrbiterAft FuselageGas SamplerSystem
ODERACS OrbitalDebrisRadarCalibrationSpheres
OI operational Instrumentation Subsystem
OMDP OrbiterMaintenanceDownPeriod
OMRSD Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
OMS orbitalmaneuveringsubsystem
OPB oxidizerpreburner
OPOV oxidizerpreburneroxidizervalve
PADM portable audio data modem
PAL protuberance air load
PGSC payload
PMBT propellant mean bulk temperature
PRSD power reactant storage and distribution
PP02 partial pressure oxygen
RCC reinforced carbon carbon g
RCS reaction control subsystem
RME Radiation Monitoring Experiment
rpm revolutions per minute
RSRM Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
RTV room temperature vulcanizing
S&A safe and arm
SLF Shuttle Landing Facility
S/N serial number
°
SRB Solid Rocket Booster
SRSS Shuttle Range Safety System
SSME Space Shuttle main engine
STI Shuttle thermal imager
STL Space Tissue Loss
TAGS text and graphics system
TCS thermal control system
TMBU table maintenance block update
TPCE Tank Pressure Control Experiment
TPS thermal protection systemlsubsystem
UHF ultrahigh frequency
USA U.S. Army
USAF U.S. Air Force
USMC U.S. Marine Corps
USN U.S. Navy
V volt
VFT VisualFunctionTester
WSB watersprayboiler
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